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1. Already in 1946 when it was clear that a war between the Western Allies and the USSR was not likely to come about for some years and in the face of increasingly aggressive Soviet counter-partisan measures, the High Command (then under General Taras Chuprinka) ordered that the UPA should gradually dissolve from its para-military status as an organized armed force and reorganize as an underground resistance movement. Large military formations were disbanded and the majority of the members were incorporated into what for want of a better term may be called the "civil" resistance organization, partly under legal and partly under illegal cover; many of them were resettled in the more easterly areas of Ukrainian population (e.g., Kharkov) so as to ensure an even spread of active resistance elements over the whole of the Ukrainian diaspora.

The Present Organization of the Resistance Movement

2. By 1948 military units as such had already ceased to exist; now only the staffs remain. The only areas where para-military groups of any size continue to exist are in the forest districts of Volhynia and the Carpathians. These rarely exceed 30 men, operate independently of one another, and are subordinate to the local "civil" resistance organization. They are, of course, mostly "illegals", i.e., non-documented or possessing only false or incomplete papers. The only other para-military elements left are two-, three-, or four-man "action-groups" under the orders of the "civil" resistance organization and engaged in ad hoc liquidations, coups de main, and other special tasks. These groups are almost exclusively of the Sluzhba Bespeka (SB /Security Service/).

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3. Thus, the "civil" resistance organization with its "legal" and "illegal" layers constitutes the main framework nowadays. It has no name, is merely referred to as "the organization". It should be noted, however, that the term "civil" is merely a term of convenience used to denote the new character which resistance has assumed. In fact, at all levels the local resistance leader still combines the twin functions of civil and military commander (without troops), as indeed Chuprinka himself used to do and his successor does now. All that has occurred is the transmogrification of the UPA from an army into a secret army, a form better suited to the present conditions of peacetime underground warfare.

The Death of General Chuprinka and the Change in the High Command

4. General Taras Chuprinka was surprised at his winter quarters near Ivov and killed in March 1950.¹ It is thought that he was betrayed by a woman courier. Also believed killed with him were another woman courier and one of the men sent in by a Melnyk group in 1949. The news was at first kept secret from the rank and file but is now an open fact. His successor is Lt. Col. Vasil Koval, alias Lemesh (phonetic), a man about 36 years old. He is one of the relatively younger generation of partisan leaders who gained quick promotion in the last years of the war.
5. Another of the more prominent leaders of the resistance organization is a certain Paltava. He is by way of being the ideologist of the movement.²

Geographical Subdivisions

6. The organization has retained the same geographical subdivisions as previously reported, viz:
- a. Stanytga: Corresponding to one village or town district
 - b. Kushch: Up to 30 villages, depending on the local strength of the resistance, the activity of the area, etc.
 - c. Raion: Consisting of up to five kushches
 - d. Nadraion: Consisting of two or three raions
 - e. Okrug: Consisting of two or three nadraions
 - f. Teren: Consisting of two or three okrugs, but in some areas up to ten, depending on local conditions.
 - g. Krai: Corresponding roughly to a territorial area such as Galicia, Bukovina, Volhynia, Trans-Carpathia, etc.

It is a matter of convenience whether the above subdivisions correspond or not to Soviet administrative areas. This again depends on the local situation.

Functional Subdivisions (called "Referenturas")

7. The Internal Security Service (SB - Sluzhba Bespeka): By far the most important, wields enormous power, and is the most efficient. It reaches down to the kushch level, where it consists of between three and ten men, depending on the size of the kushch or the vulnerability of the organization in the particular area. The chief of the SB comes under the kushch leader for administration but under the raion SB chief for operations, and so on up to the top of the pyramid. The proportion of SB men to the rest is not known but it is quite high.

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8. The SB charter is security, offensive counterespionage, penetration of the MVD/MGB, and the carrying out of special tasks ranging from liquidations to sabotage. The extent of its success in penetrating the Soviet services is not known but sources implied that it was extremely difficult and that in fact some past attempts had ended in dangerous reverses.
9. Propaganda Referentura: There are propaganda detachments down to the kushch level, but normally this consists only of one expert who lays down the general line to be put across to the local population, makes the obituary speeches, and hands out the propaganda literature turned out by the organization. It is the normal and natural duty of every member of the resistance organization to spread oral propaganda himself and to help distribute leaflets, tear down Soviet proclamations and paste up resistance posters in their stead, etc. There are special propaganda groups at the teren and the krai level and at the GHQ which have printing presses, duplicators, and other facilities with which they turn out anything from small stickers to illustrated magazines. The propaganda referentura makes use of foreign news broadcasts to issue periodical news sheets, suitably commentated.
10. Organization Referentura: Deals with administrative and personnel questions. It is represented down to the stanytsa level.³
11. Welfare Referentura: Represented down to the raion level. It assists the families of arrested, deported, or deceased members, and prevents the transfer of children to Soviet children's lagers. It notifies next of kin in the event of casualties.
12. Red Cross Referentura: Represented down to the raion level, forms medical units for the nursing of those wounded in action, obtains medical supplies, and cares for the sick generally.⁴

Communications

13. All communications are on foot, or by rail where legal cover exists. However, no rail link exists with Poland or any other country, although letters and small parcels could, if need be, be conveyed this way in penny packets.
14. From the nadraion level upwards there is a special internal courier service. For really important mail, special couriers are used; they have orders to deliver the mail personally to the addressee. Otherwise, e.g., in the case of propaganda material, mail may be handed over from one unit to the next until it reaches its destination.

Training

15. Training is normally carried out on the spot by the local unit or referentura leader. In the days of the UPA there used to be special training schools but these no longer exist.⁵
16. Because of enemy action, the above neat division of functions is not always achieved and in many cases two or more functions are in fact carried out at the lower levels by one and the same person, usually the local leader himself.⁶

Nomenclature

17. Geographical subdivisions of the organization are given numbers; e.g., No. 3 kushch of No. 4 raion. For security reasons these numbers are changed from time to time.⁷

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General Activities of the Resistance Movement

18. General directives are issued from the GHQ from time to time to the lower levels. In addition, some raions or referenturas are given special tasks, e.g., the liquidation of a particularly obnoxious Soviet official such as the head of a collective farm; these liquidations are carried out only after the victim has first been given fair warning. The general run of activities, however, consists of the all-important SB work; the struggle for survival; the constant political indoctrination of the population; education in "revolutionary tension"; anti-collectivization campaigns; propaganda against Red clubs; the inculcation of Ukrainian history, philosophy, etc., carried out by circular letters, word of mouth propaganda, lectures, leaflets, etc.; and slow-downs in industry and the local administration. Industrial sabotage is discouraged as being harmful to the well-being of the population. The only sabotage sanctioned is that of crop deliveries exported to other parts of the USSR; special operations are mounted for their destruction or diversion. There is no special sabotage referentura; such operations normally are carried out by the SB.

Winter Routine

19. During the winter months, i.e., from October to March inclusive, there is an almost complete cessation of activities, except for those living under legal cover. The illegals literally dig themselves in for the winter and hibernate in camouflaged bunkers hewn out of the earth in the forests or under houses, rarely going out except to fetch food and fuel. Some small groups of two or three men are peripatetic, keeping continually on the move. However, the majority belong to the first category and come out of their holes in the ground only in April.

Prisoners

20. Any member of the Communist Party who falls into the hands of the resistance is automatically liquidated after interrogation. Military personnel, whether officers or other ranks, are usually released after interrogation, even with their arms.⁹

Composition of the Organization

21. All classes of the population are represented. A high proportion of new recruits are young men and girls; morale among the Ukrainian youth is higher than among the older persons. Only Ukrainians are accepted as members. Immediately after the war there were quite a few Poles, Germans, and even Russian deserters (several of whom were minority nationals such as Caucasians and Turkestanians) in the ranks of the UPA, but these have now all melted away, especially as the para-military army as such has now ceased to exist. Soviet propaganda makes strenuous efforts to convince the population and the world at large that the resistance movement is composed of former SS men, Soviet deserters, and bandits, but in fact special care is taken to see that the organization is kept clean of any foreign elements.
22. Contacts are believed to exist with the Lithuanian and Belorussian resistance movements. There are, for instance, occasional exchanges of propaganda material with the latter and, up to 1948, raids against Russian troops used to be carried out by the UPA in territory occupied by the Russians.

Equipment, Arms, etc.

23. All members of the organization are armed, primarily with Soviet weapons. The most popular weapons are the Tokar 7.65 mm automatic pistol, the PPS 7.65 submachine gun with folding stock, and offensive fragmentation grenades.¹⁰

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24. There is a great need for good maps. At present they have to be supplemented either by traces, which require a laborious and not always very accurate process, or else from equipment captured from the enemy.

MVD/MGB Counter-Measures¹¹

25. The MVD has specially trained anti-partisan troops operating under a so-called Otdel Borby s Banditizmom (Section for Combatting Banditism). The troops are all Party members; are for the most part well-educated, having completed ten classes in a secondary school; and are highly trained specialists in anti-partisan and anti-resistance warfare. There are two training sections: one responsible for the study of para-military partisan warfare and one for the study of the Ukrainian resistance movement as such. These troops wear the normal MVD uniform with a flat-top cap with a red band and pale blue top. However, they rarely operate in action in MVD uniform, but are disguised as infantry, engineer, or artillery troops and use as cover the fact that they are mine-clearing (especially in wooded areas) or carrying out training maneuvers.
26. The MVD also have operativniki (operatives) who are responsible for overt anti-partisan surveillance in two or three villages at a time and who run an operativnaya gruppa (operational group) consisting of two or three "spotters". Both the operativniki and these spotters are usually known to the local inhabitants and make no special effort to disguise their activities. The operativnik is a military man and forms part of the special anti-bandit troops mentioned above. Sometimes he is in uniform, and sometimes he wears civilian clothes.
27. The MGB for their part duplicate the MVD operativnik net by a normal security net of uchastkovy (local security officers) who are each also responsible for two or three villages and who each run two or three istrebiteli (literally "destroyers"). Again, they work quite openly either in uniform or civilian clothes. The difference between the functions of the operativnik and the uchastkovy appears to be that the former is a specialist solely in anti-partisan warfare while the latter is responsible for more general security surveillance among the local population. (Sources admitted that they are not 100 percent sure whether they had it the right way around. It may be that it is the MGB who run the anti-bandit troops and the operativniki and the MVD the uchastkovy.)
28. Enemy pressure against the resistance movement has been constant ever since the end of the war, punctuated by occasional all-out drives to stamp out the smouldering fire. Increasing familiarity with partisan methods and order of battle has undoubtedly led to improved results. Most of these results have been achieved by extremely skillful penetration and a ruthless exploitation of provocation methods - e.g., the staging of bogus raids by "partisans" against MVD/MGB units conveying resistance men who would not confess and allowing the MVD/MGB troops to be routed and even killed with the object of tempting the prisoners to show their hand; the infiltration or parachuting of small groups of agents allegedly sent by the British or Americans; etc.¹²
29. On 30 December 1949 the MGB Minister in the Western Ukraine, Kovalchuk, issued a proclamation to all resistance members to return peacefully to their normal occupation, under promise of a general amnesty.¹³ In the spring of 1950, when it was seen that this appeal had failed to make any impression, strong large-scale repressive measures were undertaken throughout the Ukraine. In some areas detachments of 1,000 to 5,000 MGB troops were used to clean up the district. In one district this sweep lasted about ten days. In others they were repeated several times over a period of weeks.¹⁴
30. Quite apart from accelerating the dissolution of the UPA and forcing it to adopt its new policy of dispersion and transformation into a "civil"

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organization, enemy counter-measures have in the past year accounted for 50 percent losses among resistance ranks. It is hoped that the reorganization of the resistance movement will lead to greater security and protection, but this is the casualty rate which is budgeted for.¹⁵

31. The attempts to use a Ukrainian militia against the UPA have not been successful. Some so-called "istrebitelniye batalony" (destruction battalions) were formed in the early days after the war, composed of Ukrainian collaborators, but the rate of defections to the partisans rose so rapidly that they were done away with. The only armed Ukrainian units used by the Russians are the kolkhoz protection groups, who are employed solely against bandits and thieves.

General Soviet Policy in the Ukraine

32. The Russification and Sovietization of the Ukraine has continued at a steady pace ever since 1945. Soviet propaganda tries to convince the Ukrainians that the Russians are their "big brothers"; that Russian culture is more advanced than Ukrainian; that it is in any case idle to try to differentiate between Russian, Ukrainian, or Belorussian, either ethnically or historically; and that the Russians by their superior achievements and capacities have naturally risen to the top and are in fact the master-race, without whose help the Ukrainians will never achieve anything. This propaganda is put across through all the known mediums of the press, radio, cinema, and educational establishments. From the third form upwards in secondary schools, Russian language and history lessons are increased at the expense of Ukrainian. Textbooks on the history of the Ukrainians do not exist. The teaching staff in schools and universities is becoming increasingly composed of Russians as opposed to Ukrainians. The proportion of Ukrainian language newspapers to Russian is very low and Ukrainian papers are at a disadvantage from the point of view of news' hand-outs, with the result that the more intelligent reader tends to turn to the better-informed Russian newspapers. Numbers of Red clubs have been formed in the villages and towns, where great efforts are made to inculcate the young with a proper spirit of Russian patriotism. Russian is the only language allowed in government offices and business. Only Russian films are shown, depicting mainly Russian historical themes; very few films deal with present-day life, e.g., life on collective farms.

Deportations

33. Between 1945 and 1947 official attempts were made to tempt youths into special technical/labor schools, rather on the lines of the German Arbeitsdienst, and transfer them to the Donbas region. When this voluntary movement proved unsuccessful, the authorities resorted to forced mobilization and deportations of peasants and workers in special "kommandos" to the Donbas and the Urals. The younger age-groups especially were singled out. The categories of labor were primarily miners, heavy manual laborers, and peasants. This policy went more or less hand-in-hand with Soviet anti-resistance measures and the rate and incidence of deportations depended to a large extent on the temperature of resistance at any given period. They reached their peak in the years 1947-1948, but in fact the movement has been a steady one throughout since the end of the war and is still continuing.¹⁶
34. The favorite areas of deportations for Ukrainian labor, whether for disciplinary or economic reasons, are the Donbas, the Urals, and Siberia. In cases where the head of a family has been exiled for disciplinary reasons (e.g., to a special lager in the Donbas), the remainder of the family is automatically deported for resettlement, e.g., in Siberia. Such families may, and do, communicate with the Ukraine but disciplinary deportees cannot. In some cases whole villages are deported, lock, stock, and barrel, for disciplinary reasons. When this has occurred they have either been resettled by deportees from behind the Curzon Line, or the

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village has been razed to the ground and the land reapportioned among neighboring collective farms, new collective farm buildings being erected in its place; sometimes the village is resettled by the overflow population from nearby villages. Villages are never resettled by Russians. These all live in the big cities, where it is safer.

35. The resistance organization deliberately allows individual members to be deported in order to keep the spirit of resistance alive in the new areas of settlement and if possible to form active groups on the spot.
36. In some instances members of the organization not on the list of deportees are especially detailed to infiltrate themselves into the convoy. The organization makes a special effort to keep in touch with the deported Ukrainians in the Donbas and the Urals, not so much with those sent to Siberia, where the dispersion in any case is too great.
37. In the summer of 1949 a "voluntary" resettlement of peasants from the Western and the Northwestern Ukraine to the steppe-lands of the Eastern Ukraine, i.e., Kherson, Nikolayev, Zaporozhye, etc., was begun. This is still under way. In fact, very few peasants go voluntarily and in some cases whole villages have been forcibly uprooted.
38. In the winter of 1949 there was a forcible deportation to the Eastern Ukraine of almost all the intelligentsia of Lvov and other Western Ukrainian towns; this had all the characteristics of a special operation.

The Effect of Collectivization on Partisan Activities

39. All Western areas of the Ukraine are on the eve of complete collectivization - a further obstacle to the upkeep of large partisan groups. Each collective farm has its own protection group against bandits and petty thieves, under the orders of an uchastkovy (an MYD or MGB official). Composed as they are of Ukrainians, these groups do not usually present any danger to the resistance, but at the same time make it difficult for resistance groups to rely on the collective farms as a source of food.

The Morale of the Population and the Resistance Organization

40. The population is physically and morally exhausted by continual Russian pressure and Soviet propaganda. However, in the lands on the right bank of the Dnepr River and in Galicia, this propaganda has less effect than on the left bank and in the Eastern Ukraine. For this reason the organization is deliberately encouraging the exchange of resistance elements between the Eastern and Western Ukraine and the settlement of the more hardbitten patriots, from, e.g., Galicia, in the Eastern Ukraine. Incidentally, the transfer of individuals from the west to the east is technically easier than from east to west since there are very strict documentation controls of all persons desiring to settle anywhere near the frontier areas of the Western Ukraine. Needless to say, it is only the legally documented persons who can be transferred at all safely and openly.
41. The effect on resistance activities of the general moral exhaustion of the population can best be summed up by saying that people on the whole, especially the older ones, will take the easy way out by seizing on any excuse (such as, that the Ukrainian resistance is the tool of foreign intelligence services or that it is a rabble of ex-SS men and escaped PWs with an admixture of common-law bandits) not to risk their necks any more than is necessary. The Soviets naturally exploit this by skillful propaganda and have had some success in weakening the will to resist and discrediting the organization.
42. The Soviet theme on the exploitation of the UPA by the Western Powers has had the effect of making the resistance leaders extremely sensitive about

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foreign aid. Evidence of their sensitiveness on the question of foreign aid was the fact that the resistance organization in the Western Ukraine recently sent out to Stefan Bandera \$1,000 and a large sum of rubles (20,000?) so as to make him independent of foreign aid for the mounting of further operations.¹⁷

43. There is a downright refusal on their part to be exploited as an agentura (intelligence agency). They are willing to receive foreign aid provided it is understood that the Western Powers shall treat the Ukrainians as allies. Unfortunately, they see no proof of the Allies' goodwill or intentions in the western press or radio. Broadcasts in the Ukrainian language on the Voice of America have no specific Ukrainian content and are merely translations of the routine broadcasts in the Russian language for Great Russian consumption. The BBC have no broadcasts in the Ukrainian language at all. The lack of broadcasts in the Ukrainian language is felt to be a grave failing on the part of the Western Powers. Many people in the Western Ukraine do not even understand Russian and many in Galicia or Poland do not understand Polish. The Russian language is so unpopular anyway that the casual listener hearing Russian on the wireless, whether it be from Moscow or New York, either turns the knob on to some other station or switches it off. As far as the "war on the air" is concerned, this is all the more regrettable as foreign broadcasts can be heard without difficulty throughout the Polish and Russian Ukraine, in spite of Soviet jamming. People are not forbidden to listen to them; they are merely forbidden to pass on what they have heard. Many people possess private receivers.
44. One comforting fact in the grim tale of Soviet propaganda successes is that the Ukrainian youth is violently nationalistic and anti-Russian, and almost unanimously, and fanatically, on the side of the resistance organization. The organization is flooded with requests to join and deliberately has no restrict its recruitment to strict casualty replacements and no more. These primarily come from the student population and from boys and girls who have finished their secondary education. Even small children are remarkable for their Ukrainian patriotism and hatred of their Russian "big brothers".
45. The split among the emigration is deplored by the resistance leaders and is kept absolutely secret from the rank and file. At one time General Chagrinka even threatened to come to Western Germany in person to settle the differences. These differences are not so much ideological as the result of a clash of personalities.¹⁸ It is possible that a modus vivendi may be arrived at with Bandera as overall head of the Ukrainian emigration in Germany, having under him a council composed of representatives of the Melnyk/Lebed and other factions. Negotiations between the Bandera and Melnyk groups are about to begin. It was implied by source, and this is to a certain extent borne out by the clandestine propaganda literature brought out from the Western Ukraine, that Bandera's is the only name that has the requisite glamour to be able to be used as a rallying banner for all Ukrainian patriots.¹⁹
46. The resistance organization for its part makes no difference, however, between the various emissaries sent in by either the Melnyk/Lebed group or Bandera's: they are given equal treatment, and in fact the last mail to come out from the Western Ukraine was almost certainly in duplicate, one for Melnyk and one for Bandera.²⁰
47. The standpoint of the men in the field is that this is not the time for internal bickerings, nor indeed for idle speculation on such problems as the form of future government for an independent Ukraine, whether the constitution should be more to the right or left, how to solve the agrarian problem, etc. While they are decided not to retain the more obnoxious novelties introduced by the Communists, there is at the same time a firm resolution that the clock cannot be put back and that the more basic and self-evident democratic institutions shall be retained.

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The "Black Cat" Subversive Organization

48. The organization has had certain security problems in coping with attempts by members of the so-called "Black Cat" (Chernaya Koshka) "resistance" movement to enter into contact with them. The "Black Cat" organization is erroneously believed by some people, especially those abroad, to be the Belorussian resistance movement. In fact it is not so. The Belorussian resistance simply calls itself Belorusskiye povstansky - Belorussian insurgents. It is more likely to be a loosely organized rabble of bandits and common-law thieves who prey on the peasant community, raid collective farms, and carry out various hold-ups, and who have assumed this nickname to add verisimilitude to their cover as a "resistance movement". It is doubtful in fact whether one can even speak of an organization: it is much more likely that various gangs all over the country use this name as a mere matter of convenience.
49. "Black Cat" bands are known to be thoroughly penetrated by the MVD/MGB and sources stated that some high MGB officials are in fact members and make not inconsiderable profits from the proceeds of their black market activities. The possibility that the "Black Cat" is in point of fact a large-scale piece of provocation on the part of the MGB/MVD is not altogether excluded.
50. "Black Cat" bands are known to exist in the Smolensk area and in other parts of northern USSR and Siberia. It is from the latter areas that so-called emissaries of the "Black Cat" have arrived attempting to enter into contact with the Ukrainian resistance movement, ostensibly bearing messages from Ukrainian patriots in exile.
51. The resistance organization treats all such attempts with extreme caution and will have nothing to do with the "Black Cat", whom they write off as gangsters and no more.

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[] Comments:

1. [] for a documentary account by the Ukrainian underground of the circumstances surrounding the death of General Taras Chuprinka, one of several pseudonyms of Roman Shukhevich. Also see [] for a eulogy to General Chuprinka signed by the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army), the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists), and the UHVR (the Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation) in the Ukraine.
2. Major Petro Poltava (real name unknown) is an Eastern Ukrainian, an intellectual and theoretician, and the leading ideologist of the Ukrainian resistance movement. He is approximately 42 years old, slightly fat, slightly stooped, and is a terse conversationalist. He holds the rank of major in the UPA, is at the same time a member of the UHVR, and is Chief of the Information Bureau of the latter organization.
3. The "organization" is a word denoting the OUN, but not the UPA or the UHVR. According to various underground sources who have recently been in the Ukraine, the Organization Referentura, i.e., the representatives of the OUN, only goes down to the nadraion level since below that level there are too few members of the political party (OUN) to warrant having one man devote all of his time to "organizational" matters. It should be noted that the majority of members of the UPA (i.e., the army) do not belong to the OUN.
4. Some sources have reported that there were no medics in their raion unit or headquarters.
5. For a description of some of these training courses []
- 25X1A The statement in the report should not be taken as an indication that the UPA as such no longer exists - only the operating procedure has changed.

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6. This statement also applies to the upper levels as well. For instance, General Taras Chuprinka was, prior to his death, the head of the Provid of the OUN in the Ukraine, the Commander-in-Chief of the UPA, and the head of the General Secretariat of the UHVR.

7. Code names and numbers are used whenever and for whatever possible by all branches of the underground.

8. For translations of samples of original leaflets received from inside the Ukraine [redacted]

9. Members of the MVD and the MGB, even though they are military, are liquidated after interrogation. For a detailed study report on MVD/MGB methods of operation compiled by the SB from information obtained from captured MVD and MGB members [redacted]

10. [redacted] for the comments of Ukrainian partisans on the suitability of Soviet small arms for use in partisan-type warfare. [redacted] for similar comments on American small arms.

11. [redacted]

12. This office has received two separate reports from different sources that approximately seven MVD or MGB personnel were parachuted into Eastern Galicia in 1947 dressed in American uniforms.

13. For a translation of Lt. Gen. M. Kovalchuk's order of 30 December 1949 [redacted]

14. A usually reliable source reported that 5,000 security troops took part in a raid between the Stry and Mizurka rivers from mid-May to the end of May 1951. All sources have reported that Soviet anti-partisan activities of unprecedented size have taken place from May to at least mid-September 1951.

15. None of the controlled reliable underground sources have been willing to hazard a guess as to the percentage of underground casualties or losses.

16. [redacted] in the Ukraine at the time, the population of most of the isolated villages near to or surrounded by forests were completely evacuated by Soviet deportation actions in the warm months of 1950 on the theory that these were the people who aided the partisans. There have been reports of subsequent deportations in 1951.

17. Money, including \$3,000, was also sent out in 1950 to the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation (ZP UHVR).

18. For a report on recent events and a discussion of the split in the Ukrainian emigration in Germany [redacted] For report on the position of the underground in the Ukraine toward the split in the emigration see [redacted]

19. It should be remembered that [redacted] and therefore are loyal to Stefan Bandera. The popularity of Bandera's name in the Ukraine has been reported, however, by sources who have nothing to do with the underground or Ukrainian emigre groups.

For examples of propaganda appeals and leaflets printed by the underground in the Ukraine see [redacted]

20. This is the first and only report of any materials being sent by the underground to the Melnyk group. Pouches are known to have been received by the ZCh OUN and the ZP UHVR in 1950.

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